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Abstract 
Emission tax is an instrument widely adopted by countries and regions to incentivize emission 
abatement by emission-intensive manufacturers. However, policies differ in the methods using 
which emissions are accounted for. For example, the Chile emission tax direct penalizes 
manufacturers for the emissions they generate during their production (production-based emission 
tax), whereas the Sweden electricity emission tax penalizes the consumption of electricity rather 
than its production (consumption-based emission tax). The two differing methods have potentially 
varying implications on manufacturers, their emission abatement decisions, as well as the resulting 
emission levels, especially when demand uncertainty is involved. In this thesis, I investigate the 
impact of the two distinct methods by studying a profit-maximizing manufacturer facing stochastic 
demand. Under either both production- and consumption-based emission tax, the manufacturer’s 
optimal decisions on its product price, production quantity and emission abatement investment are 
derived. Interestingly, it is shown that under either tax, an increase in the emission tax can 
discourage the manufacturer from investing in emission abatement in some cases. The impact of 
tax rate, abatement technology efficiency and demand uncertainty on the manufacturer’s 
profitability and abatement decision are also studied. Perhaps surprisingly, higher demand 
uncertainty may motivate the manufacturer to invest in emission abatement. A case study based 
on a real-world electricity power generator is provided at the end. Using the case study, I offer 
further insights into the comparison between the two taxes and find that there exist cases for either 
tax to dominate the other in terms of both profit and emissions.
 
ix 
 
Keywords: emission tax, green technology, operations management, emission abatement, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Greenhouse gases (GHG) are gases that trap heat in the atmosphere. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) shows that GHG emissions can result in disastrous consequences, such 
as severe sea level rising, extreme weather, and melting of mountain glaciers etc. In 2015, 82.2% 
of U.S. GHG was anthropogenic emission1. The majority of anthropogenic GHG emission is CO2, 
which stays in the atmosphere for centuries. Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
(EDGAR) shows fossil fuels CO2  dominates CO2  emission, nearly doubling from 24.3 Gton 1 
CO2/yr (1970) to 46.4 (2012) Gton CO2/yr. GHG emissions are also causing loss to  the economy. 
William R (1992) calculates GHG emission indirectly leads to 6%～20% loss of U.S. GDP per 
year, or 350 billion dollars loss. 2 As a result, there has been increasing efforts worldwide in 
mitigating the effect of GHG emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
and Albert Arnold Gore Jr. won the Nobel Peace Prize jointly in 2007 for spreading knowledge of 
the GHG emission effect and laying foundations.3 The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was initiated in 1992 to stabilize atmosphere GHG concentrations, 
                                                             
 
1 1 Gton 𝐶𝑂2  = 103 Megatonnes of 𝐶𝑂2  (Mt 𝐶𝑂2 ) ; 1 Megatonne of 𝐶𝑂2  (Mt 𝐶𝑂2 ) = 106 tonnes of 𝐶𝑂2  
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setting non-binding limits on GHG emissions for each country. The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 
1997, is an important milestone linked to UNFCCC setting internationally binding emission 
reduction targets that held developed countries more responsible for emission reduction than 
developing countries. Significant progress of global GHG emission control was made at 
Conference of the Parties (COP 21) Paris in 2015, which signaled the starting point of real global 
collaboration with countries taking on individual responsibility to mitigate GHG emission in order 
to control global temperature rise within 2°C. 4 Nearly 190 countries made a commitment to 
enforce GHG emission abatement via Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 
while covering 96% of GHG emissions and 98% global population. 
Currently, there are two common methods for measuring GHG emissions (i.e., emission 
accounting): production-based accounting and consumption-based accounting. Boitier (2012) 5 
states that the former is based upon “production within territory and offshore areas over which the 
country has jurisdiction” while the latter counts emission from “domestic ultimate consumption”. 
Production-based accounting is currently more prevalent in practical implementation than 
consumption-based accounting, for having more straightforward accounting procedures and for 
placing arguably more “direct” motivation on the generators of emissions. However, production-
based emissions accounting brings about inherent risks. For example, Pickering et al. (2013) reveal 
that international agreements for establishing uniform emission policy are not frequently reached, 
and as a result, different countries often neither share a common target nor take equal 
responsibility.6 Van et al. (2009) shows the phenomenon that unfair regional emission regulations 
naturally cause more emission influxes to the region with less strict emission rules, offsetting 
emission abatement achievement and even bringing negative effect. This effect is called “emission 
leakage”.7 Consumption-based emissions accounting has been identified by several researchers 
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and experts (see Karl et al. (2014)8)  as a solution to mitigate the emission leakage effect. In 
addition, consumption-based accounting is argued to be superior various other ways, such as it 
covers more emission sources, and it reduces the incentives to import carbon-intensive goods and 
services. 
1.2 Emission Tax 
Emission tax has been one of the mechanisms widely adopted by countries and regions to 
incentivize the mitigation of GHG emission since 1970s. It is a type of Pigovian tax9 levied on 
market activities that contribute to the mission abatement. When the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed the “Polluter pays principle” (PPP) in 1972, 
emission tax became the most typical representation of this principle. In the 1992 Rio Declaration, 
emission tax was regarded as a key consideration for production and consumption decisions. In 
the last two decades, emission tax has been highly recommended by economists and international 
organizations as one of the most efficient instrument for motivating emission reduction. Countries 
like Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, and Norway were the first adopters of emission 
tax.10 Simon (2017) 11 credits the U.K. emission tax for much of the reduction in coal use and 
carbon emissions (Coal use had fallen 74% since 2006). 
According to the latest World Bank Report, as of 2017, over 40 national and 25 subnational 
jurisdictions have either implemented or planned to implement carbon pricing, covering about 50% 
of the emissions in these jurisdictions, which increased almost four times over the past 10 years.12 
Carbon pricing usually takes the form either of a carbon tax or a tradable emission allowance, 
usually known as “cap-and-trade”. 
Compared to cap-and-trade policy, emission tax is easier to implement, while it can 
generate significant revenues to be used for public expenditure on emission reduction activities or 
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emission abatement research and development. Another key difference between emission tax and 
cap-and-trade is that the emission price is fixed under emission tax while it is subject to uncertainty 
and determined by market dynamics under cap-and-trade. This certainty can be a desirable feature 
for both manufacturers and the government for planning purposes. Carbon Tax Center (2017) 
stresses that without emission tax, even the most combative regime will fail grievously in emission 
abatement implementation.13 Per those advantages, former U.S. Secretary of State, James A. Baker 
III, proposed carbon tax as the most efficient way of reducing emissions in September 2017.14 In 
addition, World Bank reports that 18 countries have implemented or are scheduled to implement 
carbon tax in 2017.  
There are two types of emission tax frameworks in this thesis, which are production-based 
emission tax (PTX) and consumption-based emission tax (CTX). It is important to note that the 
approach in this study is from a different angle from most discussions of PTX versus CTX in 
existing literature, which focuses on the emission leakage effect in settings involving different 
policies between locations of production and consumption. However, what remains unclear is if 
and how the performances of PTX and CTX differ absent the issue of emission leakage. To answer 
this question, this work focuses on illustrating the impact of PTX and CTX on production, pricing, 
and emission abatement decisions where production and consumption are within the same region 
or different regions under the same emission policy.  
1.3 Abatement Technology 
A crucial aspect of the effectiveness of emission tax is how well it can motivate adoption of 
emission abatement technologies among polluting manufacturers. The world has seen numerous 
advancements in abatement technology developments since the 1970s, such as ‘Top gas recycling’, 
‘Sorption enhanced water gas shift’, and ‘Rectisol’.15  Krass et al. (2013)16 emphasizes Carbon 
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Capture and Storage (CCS) as a key technology in reducing emissions in cement manufacturing. 
IPCC (2005) explains that CCS contains 3 essential steps: separate 𝐶𝑂2 from sources, transport 
𝐶𝑂2 to an appropriate location, and finally store 𝐶𝑂2  securely. CCS realizes 90% efficiency 17 
(proportion of emissions that a technology can remove) of reducing 𝐶𝑂2 from the atmosphere. 
According to the World Energy Outlook 2011, current CCS technology is capable of completing 
3.5 Gtons of GHG reduction by 2035, which is almost 22% of the global emissions it takes to reach 
the 2˚C temperature rise limit.18 Global CCS Institute has identified 38 safe, reliable, and adaptable 
large-scale CCS projects around the world before 2017; more than 20 will be operational before 
2018. In case study of Chapter 6, the impact of PTX and CTX on a power generator is discussed 
with option to invest in CCS technology. 
1.4 Contributions 
This thesis focuses the effect of emission tax design (PTX and CTX) on manufacturers’ production, 
pricing and emission abatement decisions. The manufacturer is considered as a profit-maximizing 
monopolistic manufacturer producing a single product, who is either directly subject to a tax for 
emissions it emits during production (i.e., PTX) or indirectly affected by a CTX through consumer 
demand. Under each tax scheme, the manufacturer maximizes its profit by choosing its production 
quantity, product price and whether to invest in an emission abatement technology to reduce the 
emission content associated with a unit product. Demand for the product is price-sensitive and 
subject to uncertainty.  
The contributions of this work are as follows. First, this work is the first to consider demand 
uncertainty in studying the impact of PTX versus CTX. This provides feasibility to generate 
insights and observe effects that would have been absent had a deterministic demand had been 
used (see Rosič et al. (2013)19 and Benjaafar et al. (2013)20 for examples of papers considering 
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deterministic demand). In fact, it is not difficult to show that PTX and CTX are equivalent under 
deterministic demand. In contrast, I show that when demand uncertainty is present, PTX and CTX 
may lead to different production quantity, price and abatement decisions, and in turn result in 
differing manufacturer profits and emission levels. These results highlight the importance of 
accounting for demand uncertainty in evaluating the effectiveness of emission tax designs. Second, 
this thesis contributes to the discussion on the tradeoff between PTX and CTX, which has 
predominantly been placed in settings of different emission policy level (i.e. emission tax rate) 
between locations of production and consumption (e.g. emission policy is only implemented at 
location of consumption but not production) to illustrate the leakage effect, by shedding light on 
when and how the impact of PTX versus CTX may vary when emission policy levels are 
comparable under the two taxes. I also analyze the impact of tax rate, technology efficiency and 
demand uncertainty on manufacturer profit, product price, optimal production quantity, and 
abatement technology investment decision respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, the effect of tax rate 
maybe non-monotone under either scheme: while an initial increase in tax motivates the 
manufacturer to invest in abatement technology, further taxes increase may have an opposite effect, 
leading manufacturer to revert to not investing in abatement. Krass et al. (2013) points out a similar 
effect that high tax increases may motive the manufacturer to choose “dirty technology” over 
“clean technology”. However, they do not consider demand uncertainty or consumption-based tax, 
and this thesis observes more complex investment behavior as a result of demand uncertainty. 
Third, the comparison between PTX and CTX is analyzed in several dimensions through a case 
study of an electricity generator. Interestingly, CTX is the dominating scheme (in terms of 
manufacturer profit and emissions) when tax rates are either low or high, while PTX becomes the 
dominating scheme for intermediate tax rates. 
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The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Related literature is reviewed in Chapter 2, 
the model formulation is illustrated in Chapter 3, the manufacturer’s optimal solutions analysis 
under PTX and CTX are provided in Chapter 4 and 5. A case study using real world data shows in 
Chapter 6. And concluding remarks lie in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The literature on sustainability is extensive, see for example Costanza (1992)21 and Adams (2006) 
22 for reviews. Both Costanza (1992) and Adams (2006) emphasize that “Ecological Economics” 
must be built in which human are responsible to coordinate the relationship between anthropogenic 
activities and the environment. Within this literature, there is a growing stream focusing on climate 
change and global warming, see Cox et al. (2000) 23 , Meinshausen et al.  (2009) 24, and Rezai et 
al. (2016)25 for recent reviews. As the key contributor of global warming is GHG emission, there 
are extensive literature on mitigating GHG emissions with varying focuses. An important topic 
that has drawn great attention from both the research community and practitioners is the 
understanding of available policy instruments for encouraging emission abatement (See Avi-
Yonah et al. (2009) 26). In what follows, the literature related to emission regulations that are most 
relevant to this thesis is reviewed. This thesis lies in the intersection of economics literature and 
operations management literature. 
2.1 Economics Literature  
In the economics literature, Avi-Yonah et al. (2009) analyze leading alternatives for reducing 𝐶𝑂2 
emission in a clear framework. Although manufacturers’ voluntary emission reduction efforts have 
produced some success (e.g. Walmart’s Sustainability Index program, Coca Cola’s emission 
reduction targets), mandatory regulation is still necessary to motivate broader involvements. 
Current emission regulations around the world can be mainly categorized into two types: 
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regulatory limit and market-based policy instruments. Regulation limit is also called command-
and-control (CAC), whose basic mechanism is to set the quantitative emission upper limit for 
specific sources in certain timeframes, and to punish carbon emitters who emit over the limit.  
Examples of emission regulations using Regulation Limit include the Clean Air Act (CAA) set by 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which 
limits 𝐶𝑂2  emission from chemical plants, utilities, and steel mills etc. 27 Market-based policy 
instruments mainly involve carbon pricing mechanisms such as in emission tax or cap-and-trade. 
World Bank Group and OECD (2015)28 stress the advantages of carbon pricing over regulatory 
limit in terms of fairness, stability and predictability, transparency, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, 
reliability and environmental integrity etc. Similarly, Climate Reality Carbon Pricing Handbook 
(2017)29 states that carbon pricing stimulates the market to mitigate emissions, showing the 
potential to “decarbonize” anthropogenic activities and facilitate emission abatement technology 
innovation. Mankiw (2007)30 points out the superiority of an emission tax (a carbon tax in GHG 
emission focused programs) over cap-and-trade in international dimension. Shurtz (2016) 31 
regards emission tax as the most effective method of reducing GHG since it provides the clearest 
price signal, and is unencumbered by factors as credits, allowance allocation, etc. Avi-Yonah et al.  
(2009) also mention that emission tax has advantages over cap-and-trade in terms of its simplic ity , 
revenue creation and cost certainty. This research contributes to the literature on market-based 
policy instruments by examining the impact of emission tax design under the presence of demand 
uncertainty. 
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Within economics literature, there is extensive literature studying the impact of an emission 
tax in the environmental economics community. Hoeller & Markku (1991) 32, and Pearce (1991)33 
clarify the definition, function and mechanism of carbon tax in the early period of its 
implementation. Summers (1991)34 takes the first attempt to quantify the efficiency of emission 
taxes of several countries. Based upon their work, Shah & Bjorn (1992) 35 provide numerical 
calculations on the revenue potential of emission tax under differential scenarios. There are also a 
number of papers in environmental ecomomics that study the optimal design of environmental 
policies from the perspective of a social planner (e.g., Baumol (1972), Barnett (1980), and 
Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995)). They show that taxing emissions always increases efforts in 
emission abatement and thus reduces total emissions. Other results include that a Pigouvian tax 
(taxing emissions using the true social cost of emissions) is socially-optimal under perfect 
competition but may not be otherwise. In fact, imposing a Pigouvian tax on a monopolist is shown 
to be not socially optimal and could hurt consumption by increasing price and shrinking demand.  
All above literature default that emission tax should be imposed on emission production, 
however, there has been some discussions of alternative methods. For example, some have 
contemplated the impact of using production and consumption-based emission accounting 
methods in an international context, e.g., Peters (2008)36 and Jakob et al. (2013)37. Liu et al.  
(2015)38 study these two accounting methods in China by both methods through an interregional 
input-output model. Huo et al.(2014)39 compare the two methods through an empirical study based 
in China. In the above papers, the key issue is the leakage effect due to separated targets or different 
emission regulations at locations of production versus consumption. In contrast, this thesis focuses 
on illustrating the impact of PTX and CTX on production, pricing, and emission abatement 
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decisions where production and consumption are within the same region or different regions 
sharing the same emission policy.  
In addition, there is very limited literature on emission tax that account for consumers’ 
response to emission tax or demand uncertainty. Symons et al. (1994) 40 first take demand into 
account in studying the effect carbon tax. They use an input-output simulation model to examine 
the possibility of achieving a 20% 𝐶𝑂2 mitigation in line with the ‘Toronto target’ via a carbon tax 
in a UK case. However, this paper only provides numerical results and does not consider demand 
uncertainty. This thesis not only considers the impact of emission tax on consumption, but also 
demand uncertainty. Both analytical solutions and a case study based on a real world electricity 
generator are provided.  
2.2 Operations Management Literature  
There is also growing literature in operations management concerning emissions and emission 
regulations. Most related ones are reviewed below. Krass et al. (2013) 41 consider a problem where 
a central planner sets a tax rate to maximize social welfare while anticipating the manufacturer’s 
decisions regarding the optimal emission-abatement technology, production quantity and product 
price. In contrast to their paper, which assumes tax is imposed on production,, this paper consider 
both production-based and consumption-based emission tax. In addition, they assume a 
deterministic demand while I consider the impact of demand uncertainty. Drake et al. (2016) 42 
explore technology choice and capacity decisions for new plants facing stochastic demand under 
cap-and-trade versus emission tax regulations. However, they do not consider pricing decisions of 
the manufacturer, or consumption-based emission tax. 
This work utilizes the classical Newsvendor model. Khouja (1999)43 offers an excellent 
review of the newsvendor model. Various extensions of the basic newsvendor model have been 
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studied (e.g. Extensions to different supplier pricing policies, discounting structures, multi-
location, etc.). Harrison et al.(1999) 44  consider a newsvendor model for a manufacturing 
manufacturer to make the optimal investment decision under multiple resources and multiple 
products, which is also regarded as “multidimensional newsvendor model”. Mieghem et al.  
(2003)45 extend properties of optimal newsvendor network solutions in Harrison et al. (1999) to a 
dynamic setting under several conditions. Yu et al. (2013) 46 discuss an example of newsvendor 
model with fuzzy price-dependent demand. However, no one is designed to address regulation 
problems, of course no one is related to emission tax. A random variable is introduced to classic 
demand function to present uncertainty of demand, which will influence every decision of the 
manufacturer in multiple dimensions, such as pricing, deciding production quantity, investment to 
abatement technology, even the comparison of two taxes. Jiang et al. (2012) 47  study joint 
production capacity and investment decisions under command and control and market-based 
regulations using the newsvendor model. Four dimensions of performance comparison are 
discussed in their paper: profit, emission, investment amount and investment timing, and they 
identify conditions under which either cap-and-trade or command and control would be preferred. 
However, Jiang et al. (2012) only analyze cap-and-trade under market-based regulations  and do 
not consider the impact of production-based or consumption-based emission accounting.    
Also related to this thesis are discussions of emission allocation among manufacturers in 
supply chains. Caro et al. (2013) show that over-allocating emissions, or double-counting, is 
necessary for manufacturers to exert their first-best emission reduction efforts. Cox et al. (2014) 
study emission allocation in a setting where manufacturers are accountable for their own emissions 
as well as the emissions from all upstream suppliers. They show that an emission responsibility 
sharing scheme where the direct emissions of one manufacturer is allocated equally among all its 
12 
 
downstream manufacturers is in the core of the cooperative game and corresponds to the Shapley 
value. Mansur (2011)48 examines the tradeoff between imposing the emission tax on upstream 
versus downstream entities, with upstream being manufacturers producing or importing raw 
materials (coal, natural gas, etc) and downstream being manufacturers that are direct sources of 
GHG emission (motor vehicles, farms, and power plants, etc).  
 
13 
 
Chapter 3: Model Formulation 
 
This thesis considers an emission-intensive manufacturer (e.g. coal-fired power plant) who sells a 
single product (e.g. electricity) to consumers. The production of a unit of product costs w, and 
generates e units of emissions. The market is subject to an emission tax. There are two 
configurations of this emission tax: a production-based emission tax (PTX) and a consumption-
based emission tax (CTX). Under a production-based emission tax, the manufacturer is subject to 
an emission tax for each unit of emissions it emits. Under a consumption-based emission tax, the 
consumers are required to pay an emission tax for each unit of product they purchase. Let t denote 
the tax rate per unit of emissions. The manufacturer can choose to invest in emission abatement 
technology at cost I, which works to reduce the unit product emission to (1− 𝛼)𝑒 , where 𝛼 
indicates the efficiency of the abatement technology. I denote the manufacturer’s technology 
investment decision as 𝛿, which is a binary variable with 𝛿 = 1 denoting the decision to invest 
and 𝛿 = 0 to not invest.  
It is reasonable to assume linear demand 𝐷 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝′ +  𝜉, where 𝑝′ is the effective price 
that consumers need to pay to purchase a unit of product and 𝜉 is a random variable representing 
demand uncertainty. Note that the value of the effective price 𝑝′ depends on the type of emission 
tax and does not necessarily equal to the price of the product 𝑝. Specifically, 𝑝′ = 𝑝 under PTX, 
whereas 𝑝′ = 𝑝+ 𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝐶) under CTX. 𝜉 follows a Bernoulli distribution, where 𝜉 takes the 
value of 𝜖 and −𝜖 with equal probability, where 𝜖 is a non-negative constant. That is 
14 
 
 𝜉 = {
𝜖,    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.5,
−𝜖,    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.5.
 
 
(1) 
 
Therefore, the manufacturer expect either of two demand outcomes. One high demand 
scenario with 𝐷 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝′+  𝜖, and one low demand scenario with 𝐷 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝′−  𝜖. 
Table 1 provides a summary of all notations in this thesis. Therefore, given emission tax type 𝜏 
(𝜏 ∈ {𝑃, 𝐶}), rate t, product price 𝑝𝜏  and the manufacturer’s investment decision 𝛿𝜏 , the customer 
demand function is given as: 
 𝐷𝜏(𝑝𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 ;𝑡) = {
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑃 + 𝜉,                                𝑖𝑓  𝜏 = 𝑃,
𝑎 − 𝑏[𝑝𝐶 + 𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝐶)] + 𝜉,     𝑖𝑓 𝜏 = 𝐶.   
 
 
(2) 
 
As a result, the sales of the product can be computed as 
 𝑆𝜏(𝑝𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 ,𝑞𝜏 ; 𝑡) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐷𝜏(𝑝𝜏 ,𝛿𝜏 ; 𝑡), 𝑞𝜏}. (3) 
 
It is not difficult to show that it is never optimal to order over 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝′ +  𝜖 or under 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝′ −  𝜖. 
Therefore,  
 
𝐸[𝑆𝜏(𝑝𝜏 ,𝛿𝜏 ,𝑞𝜏;𝑡)] = 𝐸[𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐷𝜏(𝑝𝜏 ,𝛿𝜏;𝑡),𝑞𝜏}] =
1
2
𝑞𝜏+
1
2
(𝑎− 𝑏p′− 𝜖). 
(4) 
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Table 3.1: Notation 
Parameter Definition 
t Emission tax rate  
P Subscript denoting production-based emission tax 
C Subscript denoting consumption-based emission tax 
𝜏 Type of emission tax, i.e., 𝜏 ∈ {P,C} 
w Unit cost of production 
e Emission quantity per unit product  
I Cost of emission abatement technology 
𝛼 Emission abatement technology efficiency 
 𝜉 Systematic uncertainty of customer demand (Random Variable) 
 
 
𝜖 A non-negative constant representing the highest value of 𝜉 
𝛿𝜏(𝑡) 
 
Emission abatement technology investment decision given government 
regulation of t, 𝜏; 𝛿𝜏(𝑡) ∈ {0,1} 
𝑝𝜏  
(
Type equation here.  
Product selling price under certain tax type 𝜏 
𝑝′𝜏 
(
Type equation here.  
Final price to customer under certain tax type 𝜏  
 𝑞𝜏 
(
Type equation here.  
Production quantity under certain tax type 𝜏 
𝐷𝜏(𝑝𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 ;𝑡) Customer demand given manufacturer’s decision of 𝑝𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 and government 
r gulation of  t, 𝜏  
 
 
𝑆𝜏(𝑝𝜏 ,𝑞𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 ;𝑡) Sales quantity given manufacturer’s decision of 𝑝𝜏 , 𝑞𝜏 ,𝛿𝜏, and government 
regulation of  t, 𝜏  
 
 
Π𝜏(𝑝𝜏 , 𝑞𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 ;𝑡) 
 
Manufacturer’s profit given manufacturer’s decision of 𝑝𝜏 , 𝑞𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 and 
government regulation of t, 𝜏 
 
 
ψ𝜏(𝑝𝜏 , 𝑞𝜏 ,𝛿𝜏 ; 𝑡) 
 
Manufacturer’s emission given manufacturer’s decision of 𝑝𝜏 , 𝑞𝜏 , 𝛿𝜏 and 
government regulation of t, 𝜏 
 
 
𝑡𝑏 Upper boundary of t 
Π𝜏
∗(𝑡) Optimal profit of optimal solution under certain t, 𝜏 
 ΔΠ̂𝜏(𝑡) Difference of optimal profit with investment and no investment under certain 
t, 𝜏  
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Substituting (2) into the above equation gives  
 𝐸[𝑆𝜏(𝑝𝜏 ,𝛿𝜏 ,𝑞𝜏;𝑡)]=
{
 
 
 
 
1
2
𝑞𝑃+
1
2
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑃 − 𝜖), 𝑖𝑓 𝜏 = 𝑃
1
2
𝑞𝐶 +
1
2
[𝑎− 𝑏(𝑝𝐶 +𝑏𝑡𝑒(1− 𝛼𝛿𝐶))− 𝜖] , 𝑖𝑓 𝜏 = 𝐶
 
 
(5) 
 
Under a given emission tax policy, the manufacturer chooses its product price, order 
quantity, and emission abatement decisions to maximize its (after-tax) profit, which is given as 
follows: 
Π𝜏(𝑝𝜏 , 𝑞𝜏 ,𝛿𝜏;𝑡) = 
{
𝑝𝑃𝐸[𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐷𝑃(𝑝𝑃 , 𝛿𝑃;𝑡),𝑞𝑃}] − [𝑤 + 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃)]𝑞𝑃− 𝐼𝛿𝑃, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏 = 𝑃,
𝑝𝐶𝐸[𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐷𝐶(𝑝𝐶 , 𝛿𝐶;𝑡), 𝑞𝐶}]−𝑤𝑞𝐶− 𝐼𝛿𝐶 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏 = 𝐶.
 
(6) 
 
It is reasonable to make the following assumptions for the rest of analysis. 
Assumption 1. 𝑎 > 5𝑏𝑤. (7) 
Assumption 2. 𝑡𝑏 = 
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
. (8) 
 
Assumption 1 and 2 ensure that the demand function remains nonnegative for the range of 
emission taxes2. Next two chapters analyze the manufacturer’s optimal solution under PTX and 
CTX respectively.   
                                                             
 
2 𝑡𝑏 is set to ensure even when the manufacturer chooses price and production quantity according to high demand 
realization but real demand realization turns out to be low, demand will still be positive even under the initial emission 
leval. Specifically, let 𝑞𝑃 = 𝑎 −𝑏𝑝𝑃+𝜖  with the corresponding profit maximizing price being 𝑝𝑃. Solving for the 
largest t such that 𝐷 = 𝑎 −𝑏𝑝𝑃−𝜖 ≥ 0 under both PTX and CTX gives 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏. 
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Chapter 4: Manufacturer Performance Analysis under PTX 
 
4.1 Optimal Solution  
Under PTX, the manufacturer is directly taxed for each unit of emissions generated from its 
production. The manufacturer chooses its product price 𝑝𝑃, production quantity 𝑞𝑃, and emission 
abatement decision 𝛿𝑃 to maximize  
max
𝑝
𝑃,   𝑞𝑃,   𝛿𝑃
 
𝛱𝑃(𝑝𝑃, 𝑞𝑃, 𝛿𝑃;𝑡) = 𝑝𝑃 [
1
2
𝑞𝑃 +
1
2
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑃 − 𝜖)] − [𝑤 + 𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑃)]𝑞𝑃− 𝐼𝛿𝑃  
    𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑞𝑃 > 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑃 − 𝜖 
            𝑞𝑃 ≤ 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑃 + 𝜖 
𝑝𝑃, 𝑞𝑃 ≥ 0, 
𝛿𝑃 ∈ {0,1} 
  
 
 
(9) 
The first and second constraints in (9) guarantee that the manufacturer neither produces 
more than the high demand realization nor lower than the low demand realization. The following 
lemma provides the optimal price and order quantity for given investment decision.  
𝑳𝒆𝒎𝒎𝒂 𝟏. For a given 𝛿𝑃, the optimal price and order quantity  (?̂?𝑃(𝛿𝑃; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(𝛿𝑃; 𝑡))  are given 
as   
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(?̂?𝑃(𝛿𝑃; 𝑡),?̂?𝑃(𝛿𝑃; 𝑡))
=
{
 
 
 
 (
(𝑎+ 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃)]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 + 2𝜖− 𝑏[𝑤 + 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃)]
2
),   𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′𝑃,𝑡𝑏),
(
(𝑎− 𝜖 + 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃)]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 − 𝜖− 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃)]
2
),                𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ′𝑃 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 ,
 
 
 (10) 
where 𝑡′𝑃 =
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃)
. 
Define (?̂?𝑃(𝛿𝑃;𝑡), ?̂?𝑃(𝛿𝑃;𝑡))  result under 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡
′𝑃,𝑡𝑏)  as solution 𝐼 , result under 
𝑡 ′𝑃 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 as solution 𝐼𝐼. All proofs are provided in the appendix. Lemma 1 shows for each given 
𝛿𝑃, the optimal production quantity ?̂?𝑃(𝛿𝑃; 𝑡) is higher when t is small (solution 𝐼) than when t is 
large (solution 𝐼𝐼). This is because when 𝑡 is small, the profit margin of selling a product is high 
and thus the manufacturer produces more to capture this high margin. It is also apparent that the 
product price increase when 𝑡 is small (0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′𝑃, 𝑡𝑏)) and when 𝑡 is large (𝑡
′𝑃 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏) 
respectively. However, the price may have a drop inbetween the two cases for the manufacturer 
may slash production when 𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′𝑃, 𝑡𝑏), and it lowers price to reduce the cost of lostsale. 
Next step is to solve for the optimal investment decision 𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡).  𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡) can be obtained by 
comparing the profit with investment (𝛿𝑃 = 1) and without investment (𝛿𝑃 = 0), and choosing the 
one leading to higher profit. I denote the difference of manufacturer profit between the two 
investment decisions by ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡) = Π𝑃[?̂?𝑃(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝑃[?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡), ?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡]. Then 
𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡)  can be determined by comparing ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡)  and 𝐼 , that is, 𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡) = 1  if ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡) ≥ 𝐼  and 
𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡) = 0 otherwise. Figure 4.1.1 illustrates for an example how 𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡) can be determined. The 
following theorem charaterizes the optimal solution to the manufacturer’s problem under 
production-based emission tax. 
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Figure  4.1.1: Profit Difference Curve 
 
Theorem 1. The optimal abatement decision under production-based emission tax is given as 
follows. 
 𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡) = 1 if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
, and  𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖)−3𝜖
2
) +
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝜖
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎,
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
< 𝛼 ≤ 1, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖
2
); 
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 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎,
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
< 𝛼 ≤ 1,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖)−3𝜖
2
) +
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
 
4𝑎
11
< 𝜖 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖
2
). 
𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡) = 0 if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
,  and 𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
, and  𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖)−3𝜖
2
) +
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝜖
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎,
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
< 𝛼 ≤ 1, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎,
𝑎−
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
< 𝛼 ≤ 1,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, 𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) +
𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖)−3𝜖
2
) +
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
 
4𝑎
11
< 𝜖 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤+2𝜖
2
). 
The optimal price 𝑝𝑃
∗(𝑡) and production quantity 𝑞𝑃
∗(𝑡) are given as  
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(𝑝𝑃
∗(𝑡),𝑞𝑃
∗(𝑡))= 
{
 
 
 
 (
(𝑎+ 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡))]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 + 2𝜖− 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1 −𝛼𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡))]
2
), 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡 ′𝑃,𝑡𝑏),
(
(𝑎− 𝜖+ 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡))]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 − 𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1− 𝛼𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡))]
2
) ,              𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ′𝑃 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 .
 
 
(11) 
 
4.2 Analysis 
As discussed in Section 4.1, profit difference ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡) and investment cost 𝐼 jontly determine 𝛿𝑃
∗(𝑡). 
ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡)  alone determines the first-order effect of the emission tax 𝑡 on the willingness of the 
manufacturer to invest in abatement technology. Specifically, when slope of ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡) is positive, 
the manufacturer’s willingness to invest the abatement technology increases with 𝑡 ,and  otherwise 
the willingness decreases with 𝑡. Interestingly, the effect of 𝑡 is nonmonotone, i.e., the slope of 
ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡) may change directions at one or more values of 𝑡. In fact, the number of times the slope 
of  ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡)  changes directions can take values of 0, 1, 2, 3 which are denoted by scenarios 
𝐶0,𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3 respectively. Figure 4.2.1 illustrates these four scenarios.  
   
                       (𝒂)𝑪𝟎                                                                           (b) 𝑪𝟏 
                                      
                                       (𝒄)𝑪𝟐                                                                                      (d) 𝑪𝟑 
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            Furthermore, it is shown that the number of times the slope of  ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡) change directions 
is determined by the customer demand uncertainty 𝜖 and the technology efficiency 𝛼. This result 
is summarized in the following proposition.  
Proposition 1. The number of times the slope of 𝛥?̂?𝑃(𝑡) switch directions during 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 is: 
1) 0 (case 𝐶0) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
a) 
4
11
𝑎 < ϵ ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
 and 𝛼 > 𝛼1; 
b) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼5, 𝛼8) < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6, 𝛼2) ; 
c) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3) < 𝛼 ≤ 1; 
d) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3) < 𝛼 ≤ 1; 
2) 1 (case 𝐶1) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
a) 
4
11
𝑎 < ϵ ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
 and 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼1; 
b) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and  𝛼5  < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6, 𝛼8, 𝛼2); 
c) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and   𝛼2 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3); 
d) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and 𝛼5 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6, 𝛼7, 𝛼2); 
e) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and  𝛼7 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼2);  
f) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼4, 𝛼7) < 𝛼 ≤  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼5, 𝛼2); 
g) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼5, 𝛼7) < 𝛼 ≤  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6, 𝛼2);  
h) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼6, 𝛼7) < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼2;  
i) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and 𝛼2 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼4);  
23 
 
j) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼4) < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3). 
3) 2 (case 𝐶2) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
a) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and 𝛼8 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼2) ; 
b) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼4, 𝛼8) < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼5, 𝛼2); 
c) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and 𝛼6 < ϵ ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼8, 𝛼2); 
4) 3 (case 𝐶3) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
a) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼8, 𝛼2) ; 
b) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and  𝛼4 < 𝛼 ≤ (𝛼5, 𝛼8, 𝛼2); 
c) 
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
< ϵ ≤
4
11
𝑎 and 𝛼6 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼8, 𝛼2); 
d) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼7, 𝛼2);  
e) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and  𝛼4 < 𝛼 ≤ (𝛼5, 𝛼7, 𝛼2); 
f) 0 < ϵ ≤
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
 and 𝛼6 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼7, 𝛼2). 
where the 𝛼1 =
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−6𝜖
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
, 𝛼2 =
4𝑎−11𝜖
6(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 𝛼3 =
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−6𝜖+√𝑎2−2𝑎𝑏𝑤+𝑏2𝑤2+12𝜖2
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 𝛼4 =
𝑎+7𝜖±√𝑎2+50𝑎𝜖+6𝑎𝑏𝑤+9𝑏2𝑤2−66𝑏𝜖𝑤+31𝜖2
−2𝑎+6𝑏𝑤+𝜖
, 𝛼5 =
𝑎+3𝑏𝑤+16𝜖−√𝑎2+6𝑎𝑏𝑤+9𝑏2𝑤2−40𝑎𝜖+96𝑏𝑤𝜖+22𝜖2
4𝑎+13𝜖
,
𝛼6 =
𝑎+3𝑏𝑤+16𝜖+√𝑎2+6𝑎𝑏𝑤+9𝑏2𝑤2−40𝑎𝜖+96𝑏𝑤𝜖+22𝜖2
4𝑎+13𝜖
, 𝛼7 =
2(𝑎+3𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
4𝑎−5𝜖
, 𝛼8 =
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
. 
Proposition 1 suggests, perhaps surprisingly, that it is possible (in cases 𝐶1, 𝐶2,𝐶3) for an 
increase in the emission tax to lead the manufacturer to be less willing to invest in emission 
abatement. With certain investment costs, this would imply that the manufacturer may switch from 
investing in emission abatement to not investing as the emission tax increase. In what follows, I 
explain the mechanisms driving this result.  
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The effect with an example is illustrated in Figure 4.2.1, which corresponds to scenario 𝐶3.  
 
(a) Optimal profit 
 
         (b) Optimal profit difference 
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(c) Optimal profit margin 
               
                 (d) Optimal production quantity 
Figure  4.2.2: Effect of emission tax rate t 
(Parameters: a=100;b=2;e=2;w=3;α=0.1;I=39;ϵ=15.) 
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Table 4.2.1: Solution of figure 4.2.2 
Segment A B C D E 
Preferred solution I I II II II 
Investment 
Decision 
0 1 0 1 0 
 
Under either PTX or CTX, there are two methods for the manufacturer to reduce total 
emissions. One is to invest in the abatement technology, which serves to reduce emission tax per 
unit of product from 𝑡𝑒 to 𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼). The other method is to slash down the production quantity 
𝑞𝜏. These two methods can be used seperately or together. 
From Section 4.1, it is obvious that small 𝑡 results in low overage cost and high profit 
margin, and the manufacturer is then motivated to produce in large quantity (solution 𝐼). On the 
other hand, large 𝑡 leads to high overage cost and low profit margin, and the manufacturer as a 
result produces in small quantity (solution 𝐼𝐼).  
When t is zero, the manufacturer never invest in the abatement technology, since it would 
lead added investment cost 𝐼. When 𝑡 is in region 𝐴, the profit margin is relatively high, and thus 
the manufacturer produces at high quantity (solution 𝐼 ) to capture this high margin. The 
manufacturer does not want to invest abatement technology unless the emission tax savings from  
abatement is greater than the investment cost, which occurs at the right boundary of region A. At 
the same time, the manufacturer produces to match high demand realization while 𝑞𝑃
∗(𝑡) slowly 
decreases with 𝑡. When 𝑡 is in region 𝐵, the manufacturer invests abatement technology. However, 
as 𝑡 increases, both the production quantity declines due to lower profit margin, which reduces the 
emission tax savings from the abatement technology. At the right boundary of region 𝐵 , the 
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emission tax savings reduce to the cost of the abatement investment, and the manufacturer is 
indifferent between investing and no investing. In addition, at this point, 𝑡 has become relatively 
large, resulting in a large overage cost. Starting from region 𝐶 , the manufacturer changes its 
production quantity to match low demand realization (this is why  𝑞𝑃
∗(𝑡)  drops significant ly 
between regions 𝐵 and 𝐶). As a result, the manufacturer chooses to not invest in region 𝐶 as the 
effectiveness of emission tax reduction significantly reduces. When technology efficiency 𝛼 is 
relatively low (this is the case in scenario 𝐶3), investment decisions may experience additional 
changes when 𝑡 is large, because the technology abatement effect is insufficient to handle high tax 
rate. Following that, as 𝑡 increases further, the value of abating emissions increases, leading the 
manufacturer to invest once again in abatement in region 𝐷. However, in region 𝐸, the tax becomes 
so high that the production quantity is too low to justify investment. Therefore, the manufacturer 
does not invest in region 𝐸.  
 The impact of techonology efficiency 𝛼 on profit is examined as follows,  
Proposition 2.  
∂Π𝑃
∗
∂𝛼
> 0. 
Proposition 2 suggest that the manufacturer’s optimal profit Π𝑃
∗  is monotonically increasing with 
𝛼. That is, more efficient emission abatement technology benefits the manufacturer (see Figure 
4.2.3).  
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Figure  4.2.3: Impact of abatement technology efficiency on manufacturer profit  
(a=100; b=2; e=2; w=3; I=39; ϵ=15) 
Proposition 3. 
∂2Π𝑃
∗
∂𝛼∂𝑡
> 0. 
Proposition 3 suggests that 
∂Π𝑃
 ∗
∂𝛼
 is monotonously increasing with 𝑡. That is, the higher the tax, the 
more having more efficient abatement technology will benefit the manufacturer’s profitability.  
Proposition 4. 
∂ΔΠ̂𝑃
∂𝛼
> 0. 
Proposition 4 suggests that higher technology efficiency 𝛼 motivates the manufacturer to invest in 
abatement technology.  
The following proposition illustrates the impact of the emission tax rate 𝑡. Note that (a.e.) 
denotes almost everywhere. This property can be provided as, 
Proposition 5. 
 ∂Π𝑃
∗
∂𝑡
< 0 , 
∂Π𝑃
∗ 2
∂𝑡2
> 0 (a.e.). 
Proposition 5 suggests that Π𝑃
∗ is concave decreasing in 𝑡 almost everywhere. That is, an increase 
in the emission tax leads to less manufacturer profit. Furthermore, the reduction in manufacturer 
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profit decreases with the tax rate. This is because, as previously pointed out, production quantity 
decreases with the emission tax. See diagram 4.3.1(a) for an example.  
Now it is important to examine the impact of demand uncertainty ϵ. 
Proposition 6  
∂Π𝑃
∗
∂𝜖
< 0. 
Proposition 6 shows that the manufacturer’s optimal profit ΠP
∗  is monotonically decreasing in ϵ 
(see Figure 4.6.1 for an example illustration).  
The following proposition explains the relationship between 𝜖 and ΔΠ̂𝑃(𝑡).  
Proposition 7. 
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝑃
𝜕𝜖
≥ 0 if and only if 0 < 𝜖 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛 (
4𝑎
11
, 2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 −6𝑏𝑒𝑡, 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑡𝑒(3 − 2𝛼) −
3𝑏𝑤,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝑏𝑡𝑒
2
) .
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝑃
𝜕𝜖
< 0 otherwise.  
It is not difficult to derive the following insights from Proposition 7. When the emission tax is low, 
more demand uncertainty 𝜖 encourages the manufacturer to invest in emission abatement. This is 
because in this case the manufacturer’s overage cost is relatively low, which motivates the 
manufacturer to produce in large quantities. An increase in 𝜖 increases the benefit of meeting 
demand, thus compelling the manufacturer to reduce the production and overage cost further by 
investing in emission abatement technology. When the emission tax is high, the overage cost is 
relatively high leading the manufacturer to be conservative in production. In this case, an increase 
in ϵ reduces the minimum demand and discourages emission abatement investment because 
overage cost is high, and increasing ϵ can strengthen this effectmotivates the manufacturer to 
reduce production quantity even further, which renders emission abatement less valuable. 
Therefore, an increase in ϵ discourages investment.
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Chapter 5: Manufacturer Performance Analysis under CTX 
 
5.1 Optimal Solution  
CTX is directly imposed on customers instead of the manufacturer for each unit of emissions 
generated from their consumption. The manufacturer chooses its product price 𝑝𝐶, production 
quantity 𝑞𝐶, and emission abatement decision 𝛿𝐶 to maximize  
max
𝑝
𝐶,   𝑞𝐶,   𝛿𝐶
 
𝛱𝑃(𝑝𝑃, 𝑞𝑃, 𝛿𝑃; 𝑡) = 𝑝𝐶{
1
2
𝑞𝐶+
1
2
[𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑝𝐶 +𝑏𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝐶) − 𝜖]} − 𝑤𝑞𝐶 − 𝐼𝛿𝐶   
    𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑞𝐶 > 𝑎 − 𝑏[𝑝𝐶 +𝑏𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝐶)] − 𝜖 
            𝑞𝐶 ≤ 𝑎 − 𝑏[𝑝𝐶 + 𝑏𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝐶)] + 𝜖 
𝑝𝐶 , 𝑞𝐶 ≥ 0, 
𝛿𝐶 ∈ {0,1} 
  
 
 
(12) 
The first and second constraints in (12) guarantee that the manufacturer neither produces 
more than the high demand realization nor lower than the low demand realization. The following 
lemma provides the optimal price and order quantity for given investment decision.  
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𝑳𝒆𝒎𝒎𝒂 𝟐 . For a given 𝛿𝐶 , the optimal price and order quantity  
(?̂?𝐶(𝛿𝐶; 𝑡), 𝑞𝐶(𝛿𝐶 ;𝑡)) are given as   
(?̂?𝐶(𝛿𝐶;𝑡),?̂?𝐶(𝛿𝐶;𝑡))
=
{
 
 
 
 (
(𝑎+ 𝑏[𝑤− 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝐶)]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 + 2𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝐶)]
2
),   𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡 ′𝐶 ,𝑡𝑏),
(
(𝑎− 𝜖 + 𝑏[𝑤− 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝐶)]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 − 𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝐶)]
2
),                𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ′𝐶 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 ,
 
 
 (13) 
where 𝑡′𝐶 =
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝐶)
. 
Define (?̂?𝐶(𝛿𝐶;𝑡),?̂?𝐶(𝛿𝐶;𝑡))  result under 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡
′𝐶 ,𝑡𝑏)  as solution 𝐼 , result under 
𝑡 ′𝐶 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 as solution 𝐼𝐼. All proofs are provided in the appendix. Lemma 2 provides that for each 
given 𝛿𝐶, the optimal production quantity ?̂?𝐶(𝛿𝐶;𝑡) is higher when t is small (solution 𝐼) than when 
t is large (solution 𝐼𝐼). This is because when 𝑡 is small, the profit margin of selling a product is 
high and thus the manufacturer produces more to capture this high margin. It can also be seen that 
the product price increase when 𝑡 is small (0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′𝐶 , 𝑡𝑏)) and when 𝑡 is large (𝑡
′𝐶 ≤ 𝑡 ≤
𝑡𝑏) respectively. However, the price may have a drop inbetween the two cases for the manufacturer 
may slash production when 𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′𝐶 ,𝑡𝑏), and it lowers price to reduce the cost of lostsale. 
Next step is to solve for the optimal investment decision 𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡).  𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡) can be obtained by 
comparing the profit with investment (𝛿𝐶 = 1) and without investment (𝛿𝐶 = 0), and choosing the 
one leading to higher profit. Denote the difference of manufacturer profit between the two 
investment decisions by ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡) = Π𝐶[?̂?𝐶(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝐶(1; 𝑡), 1; 𝑡] − Π𝐶[?̂?𝐶(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝐶(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡], then 
𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡)  can be determined by comparing ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡)  and 𝐼 , that is, 𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡) = 1  if ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡) ≥ 𝐼  and 
𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡) = 0  otherwise. Same as PTX, figure 1 illustrates for an example how 𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡)  can be 
32 
 
determined. The following theorem charaterizes the optimal solution to the manufacturer’s 
problem under consumption-based emission tax. 
Theorem 2. The optimal abatement decision under consumption -based emission tax is given as 
follows. 
 𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡) = 1 if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤,0 < 𝛼 ≤
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
,and 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+
𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤)−𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
)+
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝜖
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 𝛼 <
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
≤ 1,0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 𝛼 <
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
≤ 1,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+
𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤)−𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
 
4
3
𝑏𝑤 < 𝜖 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
) 
𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡) = 0 if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤,0 < 𝛼 ≤
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
,and 𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+
𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤)−𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
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 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 0 < 𝛼 ≤
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
, 
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(1−𝛼)
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
)+
𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝜖
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 𝛼 <
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
≤ 1,0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
); 
 𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤, 𝛼 <
4𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
2(𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
≤ 1,
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, and 𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+
𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎−𝑏𝑤)−𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤−𝜖)
4𝑏
; 
 
4
3
𝑏𝑤 < 𝜖 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
, 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼−2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
) 
The optimal price 𝑝𝐶
∗(𝑡) and production quantity 𝑞𝐶
∗(𝑡) are given as  
(𝑝𝐶
∗(𝑡),𝑞𝐶
∗(𝑡))= 
{
 
 
 
 (
(𝑎 + 𝑏[𝑤− 𝑡𝑒(1− 𝛼𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡))]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 + 2𝜖− 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1 −𝛼𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡))]
2
), 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡 ′𝐶 ,𝑡𝑏),
(
(𝑎 − 𝜖 + 𝑏[𝑤− 𝑡𝑒(1− 𝛼𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡))]
2𝑏
,
𝑎 − 𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡))]
2
) ,              𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ′𝐶 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 .
 
 
(14) 
 
5.2 Analysis 
Same as PTX, profit difference ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡) and investment cost 𝐼  jointly determine 𝛿𝐶
∗(𝑡). ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡) 
alone determines the first-order effect of the emission tax 𝑡 on the willingness of the manufacturer 
to invest in abatement technology. Specifically, when slope of ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡)  is positive, the 
manufactuer’s willingess to invest the abatement technology increases with 𝑡 ,and  otherwise the 
willingness decreases with 𝑡. Interestingly, the effect of 𝑡 is nonmonotone. The number of times 
the slope of  ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡) changes directions can also take values of 0, 1, 2, 3 which are denoted by 
scenarios 𝐶0, 𝐶1, 𝐶2,𝐶3 respectively.  
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              Furthermore, the number of times the slope of  ΔΠ̂𝐶(𝑡) changes directions is determined 
by the customer demand uncertainty 𝜖 and the technology efficiency 𝛼. This result is summarized 
in the following proposition.  
Proposition 8. The number of times the slope of 𝛥?̂?𝐶(𝑡) switch directions during 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 is: 
1) 0 (case 𝐶0) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
𝑎) 
4
3
𝑏𝑤< ϵ ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
 and 𝛼1 < 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
2) 1 (case 𝐶1) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
𝑎) 
4
3
𝑏𝑤< ϵ ≤
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
  and 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼1 ; 
b) 0< ϵ ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 and  𝛼6 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 ,𝛼3 , 𝛼7); 
c) 0 < ϵ ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 and   𝛼3 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 ,𝛼5); 
d) 0< ϵ ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 and  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼3 ,𝛼5) < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 , 𝛼6); 
e) 0< ϵ ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 and  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼3 ,𝛼5 , 𝛼7) < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼2 ;  
f) 0 < ϵ ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 and  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼3 , 𝛼6) < 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼7 ,𝛼2). 
 
3) 2 (case 𝐶2) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
                      a) 0< 𝛼 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 and  0 < 𝛼 ≤
4
3
𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 ,𝛼3 , 𝛼5). 
4) 3 (case 𝐶3) if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
a) 0 < 𝛼 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤  and 𝛼5 < 𝛼 ≤
4
3
𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝛼6); 
b) a) 0 < 𝛼 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼5, 𝛼7) < 𝛼 ≤
4
3
𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2, 𝛼3). 
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where the 𝛼1 =  
𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟒ϵ
𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ
 , 𝛼2 =  
𝟒𝒃𝒘−𝟑ϵ
𝟐(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ)
, 𝛼3 =  
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−ϵ
𝒂−𝟑𝒃𝒘−
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ
, 𝛼4 =
 
𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟒ϵ+√(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟒ϵ)
𝟐
+𝟒𝜺(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ)
𝟐(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ)
 , 𝛼5 =  
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−ϵ−√(𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−ϵ)
𝟐
+𝟒𝜺(𝒂−𝟑𝒃𝒘−
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ)
𝟐(𝒂−𝟑𝒃𝒘−
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ)
, 𝛼6 =
 
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ−√(𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ)
𝟐
−𝟒𝜺(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ)
−𝟐(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ)
 , 𝛼7 =  
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ+√(𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐ϵ)
𝟐
−𝟒𝜺(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ)
−𝟐(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ)
 , 𝛼8 =  
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘
𝟏
𝟐
ϵ−𝟐𝒃𝒘
 . 
Proposition 8 suggests, perhaps surprisingly, that it is possible (in cases 𝐶1, 𝐶2,𝐶3) for an increase 
in the emission tax to lead the manufacturer to be less willing to invest in emission abatement. 
With certain investment costs, this would imply that the manufacturer may switch from investing 
in emission abatement to not investing as the emission tax increase. In what follows, the 
mechanisms driving this result is explained.  
This effect is shown with an example in Figure 4.2.1, which corresponds to scenario 
𝐶3(𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟 4.2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑇𝑋 𝐶3 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠;𝐶𝑇𝑋 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟).  
In the following, the impact of techonology efficiency 𝛼 on profit is examined,  
Proposition 9.  
∂Π𝐶
∗
∂𝛼
> 0. 
Proposition 9 suggest that the manfacturer’s optimal profit Π𝐶
∗  is monotonically increasing with 𝛼. 
That is, more efficient emission abatement technology benefits the manufacturer. 
Proposition 10. 
∂2Π𝐶
∗
∂𝛼∂𝑡
> 0. 
Proposition 10 suggests that 
∂Π𝐶
 ∗
∂𝛼
 is monotonously increasing with 𝑡. That is, the higher the tax rate, 
the more efficient abatement technology will benefit the manufacturer’s profitability.  
Proposition 11. 
∂ΔΠ̂𝐶
∂𝛼
> 0. 
Proposition 11 suggests that higher technology efficiency 𝛼 motivates the manufacturer to invest 
in abatement technology.  
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The following proposition illustrates the impact of the emission tax rate 𝑡. Note that (a.e.) 
denotes almost everywhere. This property can be provided as, 
Proposition 12. 
 ∂Π𝐶
∗
∂𝑡
< 0 , 
∂Π𝐶
∗ 2
∂𝑡2
> 0 (a.e.). 
Proposition 12 suggests that Π𝑃
∗  is concave decreasing in 𝑡 almost everywhere. That is, an incease 
in the emission tax leads to less manufacturer profit. Furthermore, the reduction in manufacturer 
profit decreases with the tax rate. This is because, as previously pointed out, production quantity 
decreases with the emission tax.  
Now it is important to examine the impact of demand uncertainty ϵ. 
Proposition 13  
∂Π𝐶
∗
∂𝜖
< 0. 
Proposition 13 shows that the manufacturer’s optimal profit ΠC
∗  is monotonically decreasing in ϵ. 
The following proposition explains the relationship between 𝜖 and ΔΠ̂𝐶.  
Proposition 14. 
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝐶
𝜕𝜖
= 0  if and only if 0 < 𝜖 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(
4𝑎
11
, 2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤−2𝑏𝑒𝑡,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝑏𝑡𝑒
2
) .
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝐶
𝜕𝜖
< 0 
otherwise.  
The following insights can be derived from Proposition 14. When the emission tax is low, 
the manufacturer produces at high quantity. More demand uncertainty 𝜖 doesn’t influence the 
manufacturer’s technology investment decision. This is because in this case, if the manufacturer 
invests to the technology, the final price to customer decreases and quantity is higher. By basic 
model, in profit difference function, uncertainty has been offset. When the emission tax is high, an 
increase in 𝜖 discourages emission abatement investment because of high overage cost. 
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Chapter 6: Case Study 
 
In this chapter, I compare the effects of PTX versus CTX in several dimensions: optimal profit, 
minimum tax rate for investment, emissions. I study the case of American Electric Power (AEP), 
which is a major investor-owned electric public utility in the United States, and one of the nation's 
largest generators of electricity, delivering electricity to more than five million customers in 11 
states49. AEP is also a pioneer of emission mitigation in the industry. It has tested and adopted 
many emission abatement technologies in the past 15 years. The model parameters are calibrated 
using data from several publicly available databases, including Energy Information administration 
(EIA) Databases, American Electric Power (AEP) Annual Fact Books and Annual Reports.  
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Table 6.1:  Parameter values 
 
According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2017), the annual total 
electricity sales to ultimate customers in U.S. during 2010-2016 are: 3,754,841 (year 2010), 
3,749,846 (year 2011), 3,694,650 (year 2012), 3,724,868 (year 2013), 3,764,700 (year 2014), 
3,758,992 (year 2015), 3,710,779 (year 2016) thousand megawatt hours. U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) (2017) also provides U.S. total generation of electricity: 4,125,060 (year 
2010), 4,100,141 (year 2011), 4,047,765 (year 2012), 4,065,964 (year 2013), 4,093,606 (year 
2014), 4,077,601(year 2015), and 4079079 (year 2016), in which the coal-generated part: 
1,847,290 (year 2010), 1,733,430 (year 2011), 1,514,043 (year 2012), 1,581,115 (year 2013), 
1,581,710 (year 2014), 1,352,398 (year 2015), 1,240,108 (year 2016) thousand megawatt hours. It 
is easy to divide U.S. total coal-generated electricity by U.S. total generation of electricity to 
calculate the coal-generated rate. The total coal-generated electricity sales of the whole U.S. 
Parameter Description Value Unit Source 
𝜖 
AEP’s customer 
demand 
uncertainty 
30,171 Thousand MWh 
AEP (2016)50 
EIA(2010-
2016)51 
a 
Intercept of 
demand function 
218,446 Thousand MWh EIA(2010-2016) 
b 
Slope of demand  
function 
1.64 Thousand MWh EIA(2010-2016) 
e 
Emission quantity 
per unit 
electricity 
0.971 Ton /MWh AEP(2017) 
w 
Unit cost of 
production 24.4 
Dollar/MWH 
 
EIA (2016) 
AEP(2016) 
I 
Cost of emission 
abatement 
technology(CCS) 
1.5 Billion Dollars CC&ST(2017)52 
𝛼 
Emission 
abatement 
technology(CCS) 
efficiency 
0.9 - CRS(2017)53 
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electricity industry are obtained when multiplying the annual total electricity sales to ultimate 
customers in U.S. by coal-generated rate. Multiplying the total coal-generated electricity sales of 
the whole U.S. electricity industry by the average market share (AEP2016) of AEP 3.7% ,  AEP 
annual coal-generated electricity sales are obtained, which estimate the customer demand as: 
62,091 (year 2010), 58,540 (year 2011), 51,031(year 2012), 53,487 (year 2013), 53,714 (year 
2014), 46,037 (year 2015), 41,658 (year 2016) thousand megawatt hours. Demand uncertainty is 
estimated using the absolute residuals of demand, which is 30,171 thousand megawatt hours. 
According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2017), the annual average 
prices of electricity to ultimate customers are 9.83 (year 2010), 9.90 (year 2011), 9.84 (year 2012), 
10.07 (year 2013), 10.44 (year 2014), 10.41 (year 2015), 10.28 (year 2016) cents per kilowatt hour. 
Parameter a and b are fitted in linear demand function by the series of estimated demand of AEP 
and annual average prices: a=218,446 and b=1.64. Based on AEP Sustainability (2016), average 
coal price is $47.08/ton in 2016. The Office of Natural Resources Revenue (2017) provides that 
1,927 Kilowatt hour of electricity is generated by a ton of coal54. Therefore, the cost of coal per 
Kwh is 2.44 (=47.08/1927 *100)  cents, presenting the unit cost of production w. 
AEP has been dedicated to decrease the 𝐶𝑂2  released from coal for years, yet it still has 
not achieved the ideal result. According to AEP Climate Change Information Request Report 
(2017), AEP hard coal emissions intensity in 2016 is 0.971 (ton 𝐶𝑂2/Mwh), regarded as emission 
quantity per unit electricity e; while EPA (2016) shows federal published standards of fossil stream 
emissions intensity is 1,400 pounds of 𝐶𝑂2/Mwh (equals to 0.635 ton 𝐶𝑂2/mwh)55, suggesting that 
AEP still has a long way to go on emission abatement. 
Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) (2017) stresses that Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) is a key technology that can capture up to 90%  of 𝐶𝑂2 produced from the use of 
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fossil fuels, and store 𝐶𝑂2  permanently underground. 56  Thus emission abatement technology 
(CCS) efficiency 𝛼 is 0.9. CCS is one of the few carbon abatement technologies that can be used 
in a 'carbon-negative' mode -– actually taking 𝐶𝑂2 out of the atmosphere. Currently, CCS is the 
only technology with large-scale abatement potential for many industrial sources, especially for 
electricity power plants.  
AEP has been testing CCS technology for 15 years. According to AEP (2002), AEP’s first 
CCS project started in Mountaineer Plant in New Haven, West Virginia in 2002 with research 
funding from the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) and National Energy Technology 
Laboratory (NETL)57. In October 2017, Battelle (2017) announced that the 15-Year 𝐶𝑂2  Storage 
Project at AEP Mountaineer Power Plant had been concluded successfully.58 It is reasonable to 
project that AEP is ready for further CCS commercial-scale applications in the recent future. Since 
the data of AEP Mountaineer Project has not been published yet, I use the investment cost from 
an existing commercial-scale CCS project – Boundary Dam. The Boundary Dam project in Canada 
was the first commercial-scale power plant with CCS in the world. Boundary Dam retrofits post-
combustion capture technology to units of existing plants and the total cost of the project is 
currently $1.5 billion, which is regarded as the Investment cost I. In what follows, it is important 
to use the parameter estimated above as model inputs to compare the performances of PTX and 
CTX. 
Relationship between optimal profit and tax rate   
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                                                                     (a): Π𝑃
∗ (𝑡) vs. Π𝐶
∗(𝑡) 
 
                                     (b) Π𝑃
∗ (𝑡) vs. Π𝐶
∗(𝑡) for 10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 30                                  
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(c) Π𝐶
∗(𝑡) - Π𝑃
∗ (𝑡) ) for 10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 30 
Figure 6.1: Optimal profit-t 
World Bank (2017) releases that current emission tax worldwide is 1~126 $/t𝐶𝑂2, which 
will be used as the t boundary in all following t figures. Figure 6.1(a) illustrates the optimal profit 
Π𝜏
∗(𝑡). Several observations can be made based on this figure. First, it is apparent that for both of 
the taxes, when the manufacturer invests in emission abatement technology, the optimal profit 
Π𝜏
∗(𝑡) is decreasing in t but at a much lower rate than the case without investment. This is because 
of the emission-abatement technology reduces unit emissions and thus the impact of emission tax. 
Second, for each given t, the manufacturer obtains a higher profit under CTX policy (Π𝑃
∗(𝑡) <
Π𝐶
∗(𝑡) ). This is because under CTX the manufacturer’s production may not be entirely taxed. 
Third, under PTX, the manufacturer chooses to invest abatement technology at a smaller t than 
under CTX, which indicates that the manufacturer is under higher pressure to invest in abatement 
when PTX is imposed. 
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When t is quite small, the manufacturer declines to invest abatement technology under 
either tax, because the cost of the technology cannot be justified by the profit margin benefit; and 
in this case, Π𝐶
∗(𝑡) is significantly higher than Π𝑃
∗(𝑡) with their difference increasing in t. When t 
is around $15.55/t𝐶𝑂2, as discussed before, the manufacturer starts to invest under PTX but still 
not invest under CTX. The advantage of abatement technology investment increase at a faster rate 
than CTX’s profit advantages. When t is around $22/t𝐶𝑂2, the manufacturer chooses to invest in 
abatement technology (CCS in this case) under either of the tax. CCS is a very effective abatement 
technology with 𝛼 = 0.9, then almost all emission has been captured, thus the profit difference 
under PTX and CTX becomes small, with CTX yielding higher profit. 
Relationship between emissions and tax rate 
 
                                                                 (a) Emission -t 
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                                                    (b) Emission –t for 12 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 25 
Figure 6.2: Emission-t 
When t is relatively small and relatively large, the manufacturer always takes the same 
measures and produce same emission under both taxes. Note when 15.55 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 21.51 , the 
manufacturer chooses to invest under PTX while chooses not to invest under CTX, resulting in 
strictly lower emissions under PTX than under CTX. 
 
Relationship between optimal profit and demand uncertainty 
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Figure 6.3: Relationship between optimal profit and demand uncertainty 
The optimal profit Π𝜏
∗(𝑡) is decreasing in demand uncertainty 𝜖.  Given each 𝜖, Π𝑃
∗(𝑡) <
Π𝐶
∗(𝑡), and Π𝐶
∗(𝑡) − Π𝑃
∗(𝑡)  is increasing in 𝜖. When t=10 or 60, the manufacturer does either 
always chooses to invest or always chooses not to invest for all 𝜖. When t=20, the manufacturer 
always chooses not to invest under CTX, however, it first chooses to invest and then not to invest 
under PTX. It can be seen that when the manufacturer invests in abatement when t=20, the profit 
decreases at a slower rate than that when it does not invest in abatement.  
 
Relationship between emission and demand uncertainty 
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(a) t=10 $/tCO2 
 
(b) t=20 $/t𝐶𝑂2 
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(c) t=60 $/t𝐂𝐎𝟐 
Figure 6.4: Relationship between emission and demand uncertainty 
Emissions are increasing in demand uncertainty 𝜖. Consistent with figure 6.3, it is obvious  
that abatement investment decisions remain the same for all 𝜖 when t is either relatively small or 
or relatively large. When t is medium (t=20), the manufacturer does not invest when 𝜖 ≤ 0.5 and 
invest when 𝜖 > 0.5 under PTX. 
 
Relationship between optimal profit and emission 
48 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Relationship between optimal profit and emission 
The optimal profit increases as emissions increase. The curves can be separated into two 
groups. When t is small, the manufacturer’s concern for emissions and emission tax is low, and as 
a result it does not invest in abatement leading to high profit and high emission. (when t=0, both 
profit and emission reach the maximum values).  When t is relatively big, the manufacturer slashes 
down the emission by investing in abatement technology (and reducing production quantity), 
which also drags the optimal profit down (when t=𝑡𝑏, both profit and emission reach the minimum 
values.) 
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Figure 6.6: Analysis between optimal profit and emission 
It is notable that, the manufacturer’s investment decisions change at t=$15.55/t𝐶𝑂2, with 
Π𝑃
∗ = $2.4415 Billion, and ψ𝑃 = 11475 thousand  t𝐶𝑂2 under PTX; while this change happens 
at t=$21.51/t𝐶𝑂2  under CTX, with Π𝐶
∗ = $2.4325 Billion, and ψ𝐶 = 11426 thousand t𝐶𝑂2 . It 
can be seen from the figure that when the profits are medium ($2.4415 Billion~$2.4325 Billion), 
PTX induces much lower emissions than CTX for the same profit. When the profits are higher or 
lower, CTX induce lower emissions than PTX for same profit. 
In addition, after the investment, the two profit-emission curves are more parallel than 
before, which is because the result difference between the two taxes has been reduced significant ly 
by the high efficiency technology (CCS removes 90% of the emission).  
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Sensitivity Analysis for minimum tax rate for investment ( unit: $/t𝐂𝐎𝟐) 
Variation in 
Parameter 
% change value in parameter 
-50 -25 -10 0 10 25 50 
𝛼 
PTX 
Not 
invest.3 
53.664 17.14 15.22 13.70 - - 
CTX 
Not 
invest5 
31.53 24.59 21.51 19.14 - - 
I 
PTX 7.39 11.25 13.62 15.22 16.86 21.216 30.447 
CTX 10.12 15.63 19.11 21.51 23.99 27.86 34.81 
𝜖 
PTX 17.78 16.40 15.67 15.22 14.81 14.22 13.34 
CTX 21.51 21.51 21.51 21.51 21.51 21.51 21.51 
 
                                                             
 
3 No investment. The manufacturer chooses to slash down production quantity (when t= 17.44) to abate emission 
and tax. 
4 Three reverses cases. The manufacturer chooses to slash down production quantity (when t= 17.44) at first and 
then draw back the high production quantity with investment (when t=31.19) to abate emission and tax. (Same as 
case in chapter 4.3) 
5 No investment. The manufacturer chooses to slash down production quantity (when t= 64) to abate emission and 
tax. 
6 The manufacturer chooses to slash down production quantity (when t= 17.44) at first and then draw back the high 
production quantity with investment (when t=21.21) to abate emission and tax.  
7 The manufacturer chooses to slash down production quantity (when t= 17.44) at first and then draw back the high 
production quantity with investment (when t=30.44) to abate emission and tax.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates solutions for a profit-maximizing monopolistic manufacturer facing 
demand uncertainty to maximize its profit by selecting its production quantity, product price and 
whether to invest in an emission abatement technology under two tax schemes: production-based 
emission tax (PTX) or consumption-based emission tax (CTX). Differing from previous discussion 
on different emission accounting methods which focuse on the emission leakage effect due to 
varying emission tax levels between locations of production and consumption, this thesis explores 
the different effects of PTX and CTX in the presence of demand uncertainty. 
The result of the paper highlights the importance of including demand uncertainty into 
evaluating the effects of emission tax schemes. It has been found that under demand uncertainty, 
PTX and CTX leads to different decisions of the manufacturer and the corresponding profits and 
emissions. Contrary conventional wisdom, under either PTX or CTX, higher emission tax may 
discourage the manufacturer from investing in emission abatement technology in some cases, 
suggesting that the government should not always pursue higher tax rate to incentivize more 
emission abatement. Interestingly, an increase of uncertainty may can motivate the manufacturer 
to invest in emission abatement when tax rate is relatively low.  
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Finally in this paper, I took the case of a major electricity generator American Electric 
Power to analyze the comparison between PTX and CTX in several dimensions. The results shows 
that CTX is the dominating scheme (in terms of manufacturer profit and emissions) when tax rates 
are either low or high, while PTX becomes the dominating scheme for intermediate tax rates.  
This work can be extended in several directions. Demand uncertainty is verified to be an 
essential parameter to be included in the discussion to understand the impact of an emission tax. It 
would be interesting to check the manufacturer’s optimal solutions if the demand certainty is 
subject to different distribution other than Bernoulli distribution. It is predicted that similar 
conclusion will still hold, but the solution is more likely to be continuous. One can also change the 
linear demand function into other forms, albeit that would likely make the mathematics more 
cumbersome. In addition, it will be worthwhile to study the socially optimal tax rate of the 
government under either tax scheme and the corresponding impact on the economy and the 
environment. 
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Appendix I. Proofs 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Given other parameters fixed, next ste is to explore what impact that technology efficiency 
𝛼 brings. By lemma 1, there are two eligible solutions for the manufacturer to apply, solution 𝐼 
and solution 𝐼𝐼 . Denote optimal profit under the two solutions by  
Π𝑃𝐼
∗  and Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗  repectively. Per Lemma 1,   
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′′𝑃, 𝑡𝑏),solution 𝐼 is preferred, 
∂Π𝑃
∗
∂𝛼
=
∂Π𝑃𝐼
∗
∂𝛼
=
𝑡𝑒
2
(𝑎 + 2𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤+ 𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑝)]) > 0. 
𝑖𝑓 𝑡′′𝑃 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 , solution 𝐼𝐼 is preferred,  
∂Π𝑃
∗
∂𝛼
=
∂Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗
∂𝛼
=
𝑡𝑒
2
(𝑎 + 𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤 + 𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑝)]) > 0. 
              It is obvious that under each solution, optimal profit Π𝑃
∗  increases with 𝛼 raises. Consider 
that Π𝑃
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(Π𝑃𝐼
∗ , Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗ ) and Π𝑃
∗  is continuous in 𝛼.  
Proof of Proposition 3. 
There is another important principle that can be observed easily.  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′𝑃, 𝑡𝑏),solution 𝐼 is preferred, 
∂2Π𝑃𝐼
∗
∂𝛼∂𝑡
=
𝑒
2
(𝑎 + 2𝜖 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝑏𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑝)) > 0. 
𝑖𝑓 𝑡′′𝑃 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 , solution 𝐼𝐼 is preferred, 
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∂2Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗
∂𝛼∂𝑡
=
𝑒
2
(𝑎 − 𝜖 − 𝑏𝑤 −2𝑏𝑡𝑒(1 − α𝛿𝑝)) > 0. 
Therefore,
∂2Π𝑃𝐼
∗
∂𝛼∂𝑡
 and
∂2Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗
∂𝛼∂𝑡
 are both monotonously increasing in 𝑡 . In addition, Π𝑃
∗ =
𝑚𝑎𝑥(Π𝑃𝐼
∗ , Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗ ) and Π𝑃
∗  is continuous in 𝛼, thus 
∂2Π𝑃
∗
∂𝛼∂𝑡
is monotonously increasing in 𝑡. In other 
words, when 𝑡 increases, Π𝑃
∗  becomes more sensitive to 𝛼, indicating that when t is greater, the 
effect of given abatement technology will be stronger.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Next, the property of relationship between 𝛼 and ΔΠ̂𝑃shows as follows. There are three 
possible senarios for 
∂ΔΠ̂𝑃 
∂𝛼
, as follows, 
(1) (∂Π𝑃𝐼[?̂?𝑃(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝑃𝐼[?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝛼 =
𝑡𝑒
2(𝑎+2𝜖−𝑏[𝑤+𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑝)])
> 0 
(2) (∂Π𝑃𝐼[?̂?𝑃(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝑃𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝛼0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝛼 =
𝑡𝑒
2(𝑎+2𝜖−𝑏[𝑤+𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑝)])
> 0 
(3) (∂Π𝑃𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝑃(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝑃𝐼𝐼 [?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝛼0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝛼 =
𝑡𝑒
2(𝑎−𝜖−𝑏[𝑤+𝑡𝑒(1−𝛼𝛿𝑝)])
> 0 
Thus no matter in whichever senario, 
∂ΔΠ̂𝑃
∂𝛼
> 0.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑡′𝑃, 𝑡𝑏),solution 𝐼 is preferred, 
∂Π𝑃𝐼
∗
∂𝑡
=
𝑒
2
(𝛼 − 1)(𝑎 + 2𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤 + 𝑡𝑒(1− 𝛼𝛿𝑝)]) < 0.  
55 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑡′𝑃 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑏 , solution 𝐼𝐼 is preferred,  
∂Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗
∂𝑡
=
𝑒
2
(𝛼 − 1)(𝑎 − 𝜖 − 𝑏[𝑤 + 𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑝)]) < 0.  
            With 𝑡 increasing, Π𝑃𝐼
∗  and Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗  are monotonically decreasing. Π𝑃
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(Π𝑃𝐼
∗ , Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗ ) and 
Π𝑃
∗  is continuous in 𝑡, thus 
∂Π𝑃
∗
∂𝑡
< 0. It is notable that for second derivative, there are: 
∂2Π𝑃𝐼
∗
∂𝑡2
=
∂2Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗
∂𝑡2
=
𝑏𝑒2
2
(1 − 𝛼) > 0, 
thus 
∂2Π𝑃
∗
∂𝑡2
> 0 (a. e. ).  
 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
Refer Lemma 1, transform 𝑡 conditions of solution 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼 into 𝜖 conditions: 
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝜖 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 6𝑏𝑡𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑝),
4𝑎
11
,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝑏𝑡𝑒
2
) or 
4𝑎
11
≤ 𝜖 <  𝑀𝑖𝑛(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝑏𝑡𝑒
2
),  
solution 𝐼 is preferred. 
∂Π𝑃𝐼
∗
∂𝜖
= 𝑡𝑒(𝛼 − 1) − 𝑤 < 0 
𝑖𝑓 2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 6𝑏𝑡𝑒(1− 𝛼𝛿),≤ 𝜖 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(
𝑎−𝑏𝑤−𝑏𝑡𝑒
2
,
4𝑎
11
),  solution 𝐼𝐼 is preferred. 
∂Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗
∂𝜖
=
𝜖 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤 + 𝑏𝑡𝑒 − 𝑏𝑡𝑒𝛼
2𝑏
< 0 
It is obvious that under each solution, optimal profit decreases with 𝜖 raises. Next let’s 
consider two solutions together. With 𝜖  increasing, Π𝑃𝐼
∗  and Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗  are continuous and 
monotonically decreasing, Π𝑃
∗  is also continuous and monotonically decreasing, since Π𝑃
∗ =
𝑚𝑎𝑥(Π𝑃𝐼
∗ , Π𝑃𝐼𝐼
∗ ). 
 
Proof of Proposition 7. 
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There are three possible senarios for 
∂ΔΠ̂𝑃
∂𝜖
, as follows, 
(1) (∂Π𝑃𝐼[?̂?𝑃(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝑃𝐼[?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝜖 = 𝑡𝑒𝛼 > 0 
(2)  (∂Π𝑃𝐼[?̂?𝑃(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝑃𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝜖 =
−(𝜖−𝑎+3𝑏𝑤+3𝑏𝑒𝑡−2𝑏𝑒𝑡𝛼)
2𝑏
 
when 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(3−2𝛼)
,
∂ΔΠ̂𝑃
∂𝜖
≥ 0; 
when 𝑡 >
𝑎−𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(3−2𝛼)
,
∂ΔΠ̂𝑃
∂𝜖
< 0; 
(3) (∂Π𝑃𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝑃(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝑃𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝑃(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝑃(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝜖 =
−𝑡𝑒𝛼
2
< 0 
 Please note t period keeps increasing in order of (1)(2)(3).  
Summarize all senarios: 
 
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝑃
𝜕𝜖
≥ 0 if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
0 < 𝜖 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(
4𝑎
11
, 2𝑎− 6𝑏𝑤− 6𝑏𝑒𝑡, 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑡𝑒(3− 2𝛼) − 3𝑏𝑤,
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤− 𝑏𝑡𝑒
2
) 
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝑃
𝜕𝜖
< 0 otherwise.  
 
Proof of Proposition 8~13. 
All properties proof methods under PTX are also applicable to methods under CTX. 
Please refer to proof of Proposition 2~6.  
 
Proof of Proposition 14. 
There are three possible senarios for 
∂ΔΠ̂𝐶
∂𝜖
, as follows, 
(3) If 0 ≤ 𝑡 <
𝑎−
1
2
𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
, 
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(∂Π𝐶𝐼[?̂?𝐶(1;𝑡),?̂?𝐶(1;𝑡),1;𝑡]− Π𝐶𝐼 [?̂?𝐶(0;𝑡), ?̂?𝐶(0;𝑡),0;𝑡])/ ∂𝜖 = 0; 
(4)  (∂Π𝐶𝐼[?̂?𝐶(1; 𝑡), 𝑞𝐶(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝐶𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝐶(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝐶(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝜖 =
−(𝜖−𝑎+3𝑏𝑤+3𝑏𝑒𝑡−2𝑏𝑒𝑡𝛼)
2𝑏
 
when 𝑡 ≤
𝑎−𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
,
∂ΔΠ̂𝐶
∂𝜖
≥ 0; 
when 𝑡 >
𝑎−𝜖−3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
,
∂ΔΠ̂𝐶
∂𝜖
< 0; 
(3) (∂Π𝐶𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝐶(1; 𝑡), ?̂?𝐶(1; 𝑡),1; 𝑡] − Π𝐶𝐼𝐼[?̂?𝐶(0; 𝑡), 𝑞𝐶(0; 𝑡),0; 𝑡])/ ∂𝜖 =
−𝑡𝑒𝛼
2
< 0 
 Please note t period keeps increasing in order of (1)(2)(3).  
Summarize all senarios: 
 
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝐶
𝜕𝜖
= 0 if and only if one of the following conditions hold: 
0 < 𝜖 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛(
4𝑎
11
, 2𝑎− 6𝑏𝑤− 2𝑏𝑒𝑡,
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−𝑏𝑡𝑒
2
) 
       
𝜕𝛥?̂?𝐶
𝜕𝜖
< 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix II. Optimal Investment Decision 
Table Appendix 3.1: Optimal investment decision under PTX 
𝝐 and 𝜶 t 𝑰 𝜹𝑷
∗ (𝒕) 
𝜖 ≤
4
11
𝑎, 
0 < 𝛼 ≤
𝑎 −
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖)
 
0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖
2
) 0 
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒(1 −𝛼)
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎− 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖) − 3𝜖
2
)+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎− 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖) − 3𝜖
2
)+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 0 
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒(1 −𝛼)
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖
2
) 0 
𝜖 ≤
4𝑎
11
, 
𝑎 −
11
2
𝜖
3(𝑎− 𝑏𝑤 −2𝜖)
< 𝛼 ≤ 1  
0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖
2
) 0 
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎− 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖) − 3𝜖
2
)+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒(
𝛼(𝑎− 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖) − 3𝜖
2
)+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 0 
4𝑎
11
< 𝜖 ≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤
2
 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
)+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 + 2𝜖
2
) 0 
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Table Appendix 3.2: Optimal investment decision under CTX 
𝝐 and 𝜶 𝒕 𝑰 𝜹𝑪
∗ (𝒕) 
𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 , 
0 < 𝛼
≤
4𝑏𝑤 − 3𝜖
2(𝑎− 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖)
 
0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎− 𝑏𝑤
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎− 𝑏𝑤
2
) 0 
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 −3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡
≤
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(1− 𝛼)
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) − 𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 
1 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) − 𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 
0 
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 −3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒(1 − 𝛼)
< 𝑡
≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2(
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
) + 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖
2
) 0 
𝜖 ≤
4
3
𝑏𝑤 , 
𝛼 <
4𝑏𝑤 − 3𝜖
2(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖)
≤ 1 
0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 − 3𝑏𝑤
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎− 𝑏𝑤
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎− 𝑏𝑤
2
) 0 
𝑎 −
1
2
𝜖 −3𝑏𝑤
3𝑏𝑒
< 𝑡
≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) − 𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 
1 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒
𝛼(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) − 𝜖
2
+
𝜖(2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤 − 𝜖)
4𝑏
 
0 
4
3
𝑏𝑤 < 𝜖 ≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤
2
 0 < 𝑡 ≤
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤 − 2𝜖
𝑏𝑒
 
𝐼 ≤ 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎− 𝑏𝑤
2
) 1 
𝐼 > 𝑡2
𝑏𝑒2𝛼(𝛼 − 2)
4
+ 𝑡𝑒𝛼(
𝑎− 𝑏𝑤
2
) 0 
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Appendix III. The Number of Times The Slope of Profit Difference Switches 
Directions 
Table Appendix 4.2.1: Number of times profit difference switches slope directions under PTX 
(𝛼4 < 𝛼5 < 𝛼6; 𝛼4 < 𝛼3)  
Case Type 𝝐 𝜶 
𝐶0  (
4
11
𝑎,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
]   (𝛼1, 1]  
 (
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
,
4
11
𝑎]   (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼5, 𝛼8), 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6, 𝛼2)] ∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3),1]  
 ([0,
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
]   (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3),1]  
𝐶1  (
4
11
𝑎,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
]   (0, 𝛼1]  
 (
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
,
4
11
𝑎]   (𝛼5,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6, 𝛼8, 𝛼2)] ∪ (𝛼2,𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3)]  
([0,
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
] (𝛼5, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6, 𝛼7, 𝛼2)] ∪ (𝛼7, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼2)] 
∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼4, 𝛼7), 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼5,𝛼2)] 
∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼5, 𝛼7), 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼6,𝛼2)] 
∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼6, 𝛼7),𝛼2] ∪ (𝛼2, 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼4)] 
∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼4), 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼2, 𝛼3)] 
𝐶2 (
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
,
4
11
𝑎] (𝛼8, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼2)] ∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼4, 𝛼8), 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼5, 𝛼2)] 
∪ (𝛼6, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼8, 𝛼2)] 
𝐶3   (
2𝑎−6𝑏𝑤
7
,
4
11
𝑎]  (0, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼8, 𝛼2)) ∪ ((𝛼4, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼5, 𝛼8, 𝛼2)] 
∪ (𝛼6, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼8, 𝛼2)] 
[0,
2𝑎 − 6𝑏𝑤
7
] 
((0,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼4, 𝛼7, 𝛼2)] ∪ (𝛼4,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼5, 𝛼7, 𝛼2)] 
∪ (𝛼6, 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼7, 𝛼2)] 
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Table Appendix 4.2.2: 𝛼 values under PTX 
𝜶 Value 
𝛼1 
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−6𝜖
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
 
𝛼2  
4𝑎 − 11𝜖
6(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
 
𝛼3  
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−6𝜖 +√𝑎2 − 2𝑎𝑏𝑤+𝑏2𝑤2 +12𝜖2
2(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
 
𝛼4  
𝑎 + 7𝜖 ±√𝑎2 + 50𝑎𝜖+ 6𝑎𝑏𝑤+ 9𝑏2𝑤2 −66𝑏𝜖𝑤+31𝜖2
−2𝑎 +6𝑏𝑤+ 𝜖
 
𝛼5  
𝑎 + 3𝑏𝑤+16𝜖− √𝑎2 + 6𝑎𝑏𝑤+9𝑏2𝑤2− 40𝑎𝜖+ 96𝑏𝑤𝜖 + 22𝜖2
4𝑎 + 13𝜖
 
𝛼6  
𝑎 + 3𝑏𝑤+16𝜖+ √𝑎2 + 6𝑎𝑏𝑤+9𝑏2𝑤2− 40𝑎𝜖+ 96𝑏𝑤𝜖 + 22𝜖2
4𝑎 + 13𝜀
 
𝛼7  
2(𝑎 + 3𝑏𝑤−2𝜖)
4𝑎 − 5𝜖
 
𝛼8  
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−3𝜖
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤−2𝜖
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Table Appendix 4.2.3: Number of times profit difference switches slope directions under CTX 
Case Type 𝜖 𝛼 
𝐶0  (
4
3
𝑏𝑤,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
]   (𝛼1 ,1]  
𝐶1  (
4
3
𝑏𝑤,
𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2
]   (0, 𝛼1]  
(0,
4
3
𝑏𝑤]  (𝛼6 ,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 , 𝛼3 , 𝛼7)]∪ (𝛼3 ,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 ,𝛼5)] 
∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼3 , 𝛼5),𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 , 𝛼6)]∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼3 , 𝛼5 ,𝛼7), 𝛼2] 
∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼3 ,𝛼6),𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼7 , 𝛼2)] 
𝐶2  (0,
4
3
𝑏𝑤]  (0,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 ,𝛼3 , 𝛼5)] 
𝐶3   (0,
4
3
𝑏𝑤]  (𝛼5 ,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 ,𝛼3 , 𝛼6))∪ (𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝛼5 , 𝛼7),𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝛼2 , 𝛼3)] 
Table Appendix 4.2.4: 𝛼 values under CTX 
𝛂   Value  
𝜶𝟏  
𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟒𝜖
𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖
  
𝜶𝟐  
𝟒𝒃𝒘−𝟑𝜖
𝟐(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖)
  
𝜶𝟑  
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝜖
𝒂−𝟑𝒃𝒘−
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖
 
𝜶𝟒  
𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟒𝜖+√(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟒𝜖)𝟐+𝟒𝜺(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖)
𝟐(𝒂−𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖)
  
𝜶𝟓 
 
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝜖−√(𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝜖)𝟐+𝟒𝜺(𝒂−𝟑𝒃𝒘−
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖)
𝟐(𝒂−𝟑𝒃𝒘−
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖)
 
𝜶𝟔 
 
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖−√(𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖)𝟐−𝟒𝜺(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖)
−𝟐(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖)
  
𝜶𝟕 
 
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖+√(𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘−𝟐𝜖)𝟐−𝟒𝜺(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖)
−𝟐(𝟐𝒃𝒘+
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖)
  
𝜶𝟖  
𝒂−𝟓𝒃𝒘
𝟏
𝟐
𝜖−𝟐𝒃𝒘
  
  
63 
 
 
References 
[1] United States Environmental Protection Agency (2016). Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Data. https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data 
 
[2] Cline, William R. The economics of global warming. Institute for International Economics, 
1992. 
 
[3] Nobel Prize(2007): Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) & Albert Arnold (Al) 
Gore Jr. https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ 
 
[4] United Nations Climate Change Conference (2015). Historic Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change- 195 Nations Set Path to Keep Temperature Rise Well Below 2 Degrees Celsius. 
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/finale-cop21/ 
 
[5] Boitier, Baptiste. "CO2 emissions production-based accounting vs consumption: Insights from 
the WIOD databases." WIOD Conference Paper, April. 2012. 
 
[6] Pickering, Jonathan, Frank Jotzo, and Peter J. Wood. Splitting the difference in global climate 
finance: are fragmentation and legitimacy mutually exclusive?. Centre for Climate Economics and 
Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, 2013. 
 
[7] Van Asselt, Harro, Thomas L. Brewer, and Michael A. Mehling. "Addressing leakage and 
competitiveness in US climate policy: Issues concerning border adjustment measures." (2009). 
 
[8] Steininger, Karl, et al. "Justice and cost effectiveness of consumption-based versus 
production-based approaches in the case of unilateral climate policies." Global Environmental 
Change 24 (2014): 75-87. 
 
[9] Pigou, Arthur Cecil. The economics of welfare. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
 
[10] Katsoulacos, Yannis, and Anastasios Xepapadeas. "Environmental policy under oligopoly 
with endogenous market structure." The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (1995): 411-420. 
 
[11] Simon Evans. “Analysis: UK carbon emissions fell 6% in 2016 after record drop in coal use”. 
Carbon Brief, 2017. 
https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-uk-cuts-carbon-record-coal-drop 
 
[12] Carbon, At A. Glance–New, And Paris Agreement Era. "Carbon Pricing Watch 2017." 
 
[13] Carbon Tax Center (2017). The Basics: 'What's a carbon tax'.  
https://www.carbontax.org / whats-a- carbon-tax/ 
 
64 
 
 
[14] New York Times (FEB. 7. 2017). ‘A Conservative Climate Solution’: Republican Group Calls 
for Carbon Tax.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/science/a-conservative-climate-solution-republican-group-
calls-for-carbon-tax.html 
 
[15] Brown, T., et al. "Reducing CO2 emissions from heavy industry: a review of technologies 
and considerations for policy makers." Grantham Institute Briefing Paper 7 (2012). 
 
[16] Krass, Dmitry, Timur Nedorezov, and Anton Ovchinnikov. "Environmental taxes and the 
choice of green technology." Production and operations management 22.5 (2013): 1035-1055 
 
[17] Metz, Bert, et al. IPCC special report on carbon dioxide capture and storage.  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva (Switzerland). Working Group III, 2005. 
 
[18] IEA, IEA. "World energy outlook 2011." Int. Energy Agency (2011): 666. 
 
[19] Rosič, Heidrun, and Werner Jammernegg. "The economic and environmental performance of 
dual sourcing: A newsvendor approach." International Journal of Production Economics 143.1 
(2013): 109-119. 
 
[20] Benjaafar, Saif, Yanzhi Li, and Mark Daskin. "Carbon footprint and the management of 
supply chains: Insights from simple models." IEEE transactions on automation science and 
engineering 10.1 (2013): 99-116. 
 
[21] Costanza, Robert. Ecological economics: the science and management of sustainability. 
Columbia University Press, 1992. 
 
[22] Adams, William M. "The future of sustainability: Re-thinking environment and development 
in the twenty-first century." Report of the IUCN renowned thinkers meeting. Vol. 29. 2006. 
Caro, F., C. J. Corbett, T. Tan and R. Zuidwijk (2013). Double Counting in Supply 
Chain Carbon Footprinting. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. 15(4) 
545-558. 
 
[23] Cox, Peter M., et al. "Acceleration of global warming due to carbon-cycle feedbacks in a 
coupled climate model." Nature 408.6809 (2000): 184-187. 
Granot, D., F. Granot and G. S_osi_c (2014). Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
in Supply Chains. Working paper, Sauder School of Business, University of British 
Columbia, Canada. 
 
[24] Meinshausen, Malte, et al. "Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 
2 C." Nature 458.7242 (2009): 1158-1162. 
 
[25] Rezai, Armon, Duncan K. Foley, and Lance Taylor. "Global warming and economic 
externalities." The Economics of the Global Environment. Springer International Publishing, 
2016. 447-470. 
 
65 
 
 
[26] Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., and David M. Uhlmann. "Combating global climate change: Why a 
carbon tax is a better response to global warming than cap and trade." (2009). 
 
[27] United States Environmental Protection Agency (2016). Regulatory Information by Topic: 
Air. 
https://www.epa.gov/regulatory-information-topic/regulatory-information-topic-air 
 
[28] World Bank. 2015. The FASTER principles for successful carbon pricing : an approach based 
on initial experience. Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. 
 
[29] The Climate Reality Project(2017). Handbook On Carbon Pricing Instruments. 
https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/carbon-pricing-does-it-work 
 
[30] Mankiw, N. Gregory. "One answer to global warming: A new tax." The New York Times 
7.16 (2007): 09. 
 
[31] Shurtz, Nancy. "Carbon Pricing Initiatives in Western North America: Blueprint for Global 
Climate Change Policy." San Diego Journal of Climate & Energy Law 7.1 (2016): 4. 
 
[32] Hoeller, Peter, and Markku Wallin. Energy prices, taxes and carbon dioxide emissions. No. 
106. Paris: OECD, 1991. 
 
[33] Pearce, David. "The role of carbon taxes in adjusting to global warming." The economic 
journal 101.407 (1991): 938-948. 
 
[34] Summers, Lawrence H. "The case for corrective taxation." National Tax Journal 44.3 (1991): 
289-292. 
 
[35] Shah, Anwar, and Bjorn Larsen. Carbon taxes, the greenhouse effect, and developing 
countries. Vol. 957. World Bank Publications, 1992. 
 
[36] Peters, Glen P. "From production-based to consumption-based national emission inventories." 
Ecological economics 65.1 (2008): 13-23. 
 
[37] Jakob, Michael, Robert Marschinski, and Michael Hübler. "Between a rock and a hard place: 
a trade-theory analysis of leakage under production-and consumption-based policies." 
Environmental and Resource Economics 56.1 (2013): 47-72. 
 
[38] Liu, Lan-Cui, Qiao-Mei Liang, and Qian Wang. "Accounting for China's regional carbon 
emissions in 2002 and 2007: production-based versus consumption-based principles." Journal of 
Cleaner Production 103 (2015): 384-392. 
 
[39] Huo, Hong, et al. "Examining air pollution in China using production-and consumption-based 
emissions accounting approaches." Environmental science & technology 48.24 (2014): 14139-
14147. 
 
66 
 
 
[40] Symons, Elizabeth, John Proops, and Philip Gay. "Carbon taxes, consumer demand and 
carbon dioxide emissions: a simulation analysis for the UK." Fiscal Studies 15.2 (1994): 19-43. 
 
[41] Krass, Dmitry, Timur Nedorezov, and Anton Ovchinnikov. "Environmental taxes and the 
choice of abatement technology." Production and Operations Management 22.5 (2013): 1035-1055. 
 
[42] Drake, David, Paul R. Kleindorfer, and Luk N. Van Wassenhove. "Technology choice and 
capacity investment under emissions regulation." Production and Operations Management (2016), 
25(6): 1006-1025. 
 
[43] Khouja, Moutaz."The single-period (news-vendor) problem: literature review and suggestions 
for future research." Omega 27.5 (1999): 537-553. 
 
[44] Harrison, J. Michael, and Jan A. Van Mieghem. "Multi-resource investment strategies: 
Operational hedging under demand uncertainty." European Journal of Operational Research 
113.1 (1999): 17-29. 
 
[45] Mieghem, Jan A. Van, and Nils Rudi. "Newsvendor networks: Inventory management and 
capacity investment with discretionary activities." Manufacturing & Service Operations 
Management 4.4 (2002): 313-335. 
 
[46] Yu, Ying, Ji Zhu, and Chenwei Wang. "A newsvendor model with fuzzy price-dependent 
demand." Applied Mathematical Modelling 37.5 (2013): 2644-2661. 
 
[47] Jiang, Yan, and Diego Klabjan. "Optimal emissions reduction investment under greenhouse 
gas emissions regulations." Evanston: Northwestern University (2012). 
 
[48] Mansur, Erin T. "Upstream versus downstream implementation of climate policy." The 
Design and Implementation of US Climate Policy. University of Chicago Press, 2011. 179-193. 
 
[49] https://www.aep.com/investors/financialfilingsandreports/annualReportsProxies/ 
 
[50] American Electric Power (AEP) (2016) Fact Book- 51st EEI Financial Conference. https: 
//www.aep.com/investors/eventspresentationsandwebcasts/documents/2016EEI_FactBookv2.pdf 
 
[51] Energy Information administration (EIA) (2016). Electricity Sales to Ultimate Customers and 
Average Price Annually. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_01_02.html 
 
[52] Stéphenne, Karl. Carbon Capture and Sequestration Technologies Program at MIT(CC&ST). 
"Start-up of world's first commercial post-combustion coal fired CCS project: contribution of Shell 
Cansolv to SaskPower Boundary Dam ICCS Project." Energy Procedia 63 (2014): 6106-6110. 
And link: http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/boundary_dam.html 
 
[53] Congressional Research Service (CRS)(2017) Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in 
the United States. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44902.pdf 
 
67 
 
 
[54] U.S. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (USEITI) (2017) Common Energy Units 
Conversion and Other Commodities Review.  
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/common_energy_units_conversion_other_comm
odities_review_final_1-30-17.pdf 
 
[55] American Electric Power (AEP) (2016) Annual Report- Appendix A to the Proxy Statement. 
https://www.aep.com/investors/financialfilingsandreports/annualReportsProxies/docs/16annrep/2
016AnnualReportAppendixAtoProxy.pdf 
 
[56] Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) (2017). 'What is CCS?'. 
http://www.ccsassociation.org/what-is-ccs/ 
 
[57] American Electric Power (2002) AEP’s Mountaineer Plant to be site for research projec t on 
Climate Change technology. https://aep.com/newsroom/newsreleases/?id=971 
 
[58] Battelle (2017) Battelle Completes 15-Year CO2 Storage Project at Mountaineer Power Plant. 
https://www.battelle.org/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-detail/battelle-completes-15-
year-co2-storage-project-at-mountaineer-power-plant 
